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WHEN SECURITY INTERESTS BECOME LIABILITIES:
LENDERS LOOK TO LIMIT EXPOSURE FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE CLEANUP COSTS UNDER SUPERFUND
E. Deren Breast
Thomas P. Cody
A series of controversial decisions in the federal courts have
steadily increased financial institution and secured creditor exposure
for hazardous waste cleanup costs under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA" or "Superfund").1 Due in part to pressure from the
business and financial lending community, Congress and the
Environmental Protection Agency have responded with legislative
and administrative proposals to reduce lender exposure for hazardous
waste cleanup costs. In 1991, the federal government will face
difficult decisions in redefining the scope of liability for hazardous
waste cleanups.
Three bills have been introduced in Congress which would
reduce sharply the potential hazardous waste cleanup liability of
financial institutions. The bills force Congress to consider the effects
of its hazardous waste policies enunciated in 1980 and 1986, and
reconcile them with current domestic issues such as economic growth
and the health of the real estate and financial lending industries. In
the light of these potentially conflicting policy goals, Congress must
address whether the federal courts have accurately interpreted
CERCLA's mandate. If the courts have misconstrued legislative
intent, or if Congress believes that its original policies are no longer
tenable, significant changes in CERCLA may be imminent.
The Environmental Protection Agency has also proposed a
solution in the form of a draft interpretative rule. The rule attempts
to clarify the scope of lender liability under CERCLA, but would be

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
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less sweeping in effect than the proposed legislative changes. If the
interpretative rule clarifies lender liability under CERCLA, legislative
changes may be unnecessary. On the other hand, the executive
branch must consider whether an interpretative rule is necessary or
appropriate in light of congressional efforts to amend CERCLA.
LIABILITY UNDER

CERCLA

CERCLA authorizes the federal government to clean up
hazardous waste releases and recover the costs of removal or
remedial action, natural resource damage, and health effects studies
from certain responsible parties.2 Responsible parties include "the
owner and operator of a vessel or a facility," past owners or
operators of facilities if any hazardous substances were disposed
during their tenure, persons involved in disposal or treatment of
3
hazardous substances, and transporters of hazardous substances.
Lending institutions and other creditors holding indicia of ownership
to protect a security interest are generally exempted from such
liability if they have not "participat[ed] in the management of a vessel
or facility.""
CERCLA does not define, however, the extent of involvement
required to trigger "participation in the management of a vessel or
facility." Thus, the scope of liability as an owner or operator under
CERCLA is not clear. Attempting to fulfill the intent of the
legislature, the federal government has prosecuted financial
institutions as "owners and operators" in a number of contexts. Not
surprisingly, many financial institutions have challenged these

interpretations of CERCLA liability.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 9601(20)(A).

The federal courts have

LENDER LIABILITY

arguably increased financial institution exposure for hazardous waste
cleanups, which has prompted an outcry for reform.
FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS

LENDER LIABILITY UNDER

OF

CERCLA

United States v. Mirabile

The federal courts first articulated a distinction between
permissible participation in the financial management of a facility and
impermissible participation in the day-to-day or operational aspects
of a facility in United States v. Mirabile.5

In Mirabile, the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
summary judgment to the defendant creditors, who had foreclosed on
contaminated property, because their participation in the affairs of
the polluting facility was limited to participation in financial
decisions.6 The court found that the "participation which is critical
is participation in operational, production, or waste disposal activities.
Mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices ... is not.
sufficient for the imposition of liability." 7 Thus, the court in
*

Mirabile distinguished financial from managerial or operational
involvement in determining whether a secured creditor's involvement
is significant enough to trigger liability under CERCLA.
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.

One of the most important cases before 1990 that interpreted
the liability of secured creditors was United States v. Maryland Bank

& Trust Co.8 The defendant, Maryland Bank & Trust ("MB & T"),

5. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
6. Id. at 20994.
7. Id.

8. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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had held a mortgage on a parcel of land and later purchased the
land at a foreclosure sale. After MB & T declined to clean up
hazardous waste on the property, the Environmental Protection
Agency conducted a removal action under the authority of CERCLA.
The federal government then brought an action against the bank to
9
recover the cleanup costs.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
held that MB & T was required to reimburse the United States for
the cleanup costs.10 The court imposed liability even though the
illegal waste disposal occurred prior to the bank's purchase of the
property. The court stated that "[flinancial institutions are in a
position to investigate and discover potential problems in their
secured properties. . . . CERCLA will not absolve them from
responsibility for their mistakes of judgment."11
The court in Maryland Bank distinguished full title owners
from persons holding indicia of ownership merely to protect a security
interest in land.' 2 MB & T's liability was founded upon their full
ownership of the property for four years following purchase at the
foreclosure sale, rather than any participation in the management or
operations of the facility. The court distinguished Mirabile, stating
that there, the mortgagee's purchase of the .land at the foreclosure
was "plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in
3
the property" since the property was assigned four months later.'
The court expressed the concern that exemption from liability under
CERCLA would enable the bank to collect a windfall from the

9. Id. at 576.
10. Id. at 578.
11. Id. at 580.
12. Id. at 579.
13. Id. at 580.
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increased value of the property following the government's cleanup.14
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.
The interpretation of financial institution exposure for
hazardous waste cleanup costs announced in Maryland Bank was
expanded in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co."
BFG Electroplating involved a mortgagee bank which purchased the
mortgaged property at a sheriffs sale and held the property for
approximately eight months. The court held that "[w]hen a lender is
the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be
liable to the same extent as any other bidder at the sale would have
been. '1 6 The court in BFG Electroplating refused to apply the section
9601(20)(A) exemption from response cost liability for security
interest holders. Instead, the court was persuaded by the concern
expressed in MarylandBank that an exemption for landowning lenders
would create a special class of otherwise liable landowners. 7 The
court also noted that Congress did not add any specific exemptions
for mortgagees-turned-landowners when it amended and reauthorized
Arguably, BFG Electroplating expanded the
CERCLA in 1986.1
Maryland Bank interpretation of liability because the bank in BFG
Electroplating had owned the contaminated property for only eight
months, compared to four years in Maryland Bank.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.

14. Id
15. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
16. Id. at 563.
17. Id.
18. Id
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results on financial institutions, secured lenders might have believed
in early 1990 that CERCLA offered them some protection, provided
they retained only security interests in contaminated property and
they did not participate actively in the production or management of
hazardous waste. Any sense of certainty ended abruptly on May 23,
1990, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit decided United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.19
In Fleet Factors, the court held that a secured creditor may
incur liability as a past owner or operator of a facility where
hazardous substances were disposed of, "by participating in the
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity
to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. ' 20 The
court in Fleet Factorsrejected the rule set forth in Mirabile that "mere
financial ability to control waste disposal practices

sufficient for the imposition of liability.

.

.

.

is not . . .

21

It is not necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve
itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be
liable .

. .

. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to

participate in management decisions relating to hazardous
waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its
involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently
broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous

19. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir.1990)(en

banc).
20. Id. at 1557 (emphasis added). The court of appeals held that the district
court had correctly denied secured lender Fleet's motion for summary judgment.
Material issues of fact existed concerning the extent of Fleet's involvement in the
management of a textile facility where hazardous waste was produced and stored
since Fleet held a security interest on the property. Although Fleet never
foreclosed on the property, it held "indicia of ownership" pursuant to its security
interest in the form of a deed of trust.
21. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
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waste disposal decisions if it so chose.22
The decision to invoke lender liability thus did not rest on whether
the creditor owned the facility, but whether the secured creditor
exercised sufficient control over the business actions of the debtor
facility.
Fleet Factors should not be read to impose unconditional
liability on the secured creditors of businesses involved with hazardous
waste. The court in Fleet Factors stated that the decision did not
preclude secured creditors from "monitoring any aspect of a debtor's
business" or "becom[ing] involved in occasional and discrete financial
decisions relating to the protection of its security interest without
incurring liability."23 The court stated that the nature and extent of
the creditor's involvement with the facility, and not its motive in
protecting a security interest, is relevant to the extent of protection
provided by CERCLA's secured creditor exemption.24
In Re Bergsoe Metal Corp.
On August 9, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided In Re Bergsoe Metal Corp.25 In Bergsoe, the
Port of St. Helens, Oregon ("Port"), entered into a complex
agreement with Bergsoe Metal Corporation and the United States
National Bank of Oregon ("Bank") to finance the construction of a
lead recycling plant. 26 Under the agreement, the Port held title to
the plant property, leased it back to Bergsoe, and issued revenue
bonds to finance Bergsoe's construction of the plant. The Bank held

22. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
23. Id. at 1558.
24. Id. at 1560.
25. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).

26. Id. at 669-70.
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the mortgage to the plant property, collected rent directly from
Bergsoe, and applied the rent toward the bonds. Upon retirement
of the bonds, Bergsoe could then exercise an option to purchase the
property for a nominal sum. Bergsoe defaulted on the leases,
however, and was placed in involuntary bankruptcy. When the Bank
sought liability for cleanup of hazardous wastes on the site, Bergsoe
counterclaimed that the Port was liable under CERCLA as an
"owner" of the plant.
The court held that the Port was not liable as an "owner"
under CERCLA, even though it held the deed to the underlying
property, because the Port fell within the scope of the secured
creditors exemption. 27 The Port successfully argued that it held
indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest in the
plant and it did not participate in the management of Bergsoe's
operations.
In Bergsoe, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis in Fleet Factors, but held that "there must be some
actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall
outside the exception. ' 28 The court thus refused to impose liability
for having the mere "capacity to influence" the management of
hazardous waste, as the Eleventh Circuit had held in Fleet Factors.
Although in theory Bergsoe may not be inconsistent with Fleet Factors,
Bergsoe effectively narrowed the Fleet Factors holding and leaves the
29
two cases difficult to reconcile from a practical standpoint.
Effects of the Cases
Many business and government leaders believe that the federal

27. Id. at 671-73.
28. Id. at 672.
29. Alder, Courts Split Over Liability of Lenders for Site Cleanup, Bus. INS.,
Sept. 3, 1990, at 8.
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courts have exposed financial institutions to liability that is neither
intended nor just.3" Several specific concerns have been expressed.
First, the cases have blurred the distinction between a lender's
financial involvement in the affairs of a facility for the purposes of
monitoring a security interest, and involvement in actual hazardous
waste production or management. Thus, necessary oversight of a
debtor's financial health may be discouraged. Second, uncertain
liability has discouraged extension of credit to businesses involved with
hazardous waste. This may indiscriminately discourage loans to all
handlers of hazardous waste, including those businesses which
responsibly handle hazardous waste. Third, increased lender exposure
for hazardous waste removal has increased the cost of credit to all
businesses and industries, and hurt small businesses in particular.
Finally, the specter of liability for the cost of hazardous waste
removal has complicated the bailout of the savings and loan industry,
since many properties held by the Resolution Trust Corporation may
be contaminated.
As a result of these concerns, many business and government
leaders are seeking to limit financial institution exposure for
hazardous waste cleanups under CERCLA. Organizations such as the
Small Business Administration and the American Bankers Association
have testified at congressional committee hearings that increased
exposure for hazardous waste cleanups increases the cost of extending
credit to borrowers, hampers business initiatives, and has a negative

30. See Legislation To Restore Small Business FinancingIn Areas Of Possible
Hazardous Waste Contamination, 136 CONG. REc. E1023 (remarks of Rep. John

LaFalce).
31. Roberts, Get Readyfor Recession by Strangulation, Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 1990,

at 22; but see Collins, Lenders Disputed on Contention That Cleanup Laws Will Ruin
Industry, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
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effect on the economy.32 Congress has also heard testimony from
industries such as electric platers, drycleaners, wood product
manufacturers and metal finishers that use hazardous wastes and
which have been affected adversely by lender reluctance to extend
33
credit to businesses involved with hazardous waste.
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSALS

Concern for the decision in Maryland Bank and BFG
Electroplating prompted the introduction of a House bill in 1989 to

amend CERCLA.34 After that bill failed to escape committee, three
more bills were introduced in March, April, and October of 1990. 35
Furthermore, the EPA proposed a draft interpretative rule concerning
lender liability under CERCLA in September of 1990.36
House Bill 4494
On April 4, 1990, Representative John LaFalce (D-N.Y.)
introduced House Bill 4494, an amended version of his 1989 House
Bill 2085. 37 House Bill 4494 would amend CERCLA to limit the
liability of lending institutions acquiring facilities through foreclosure
or similar means and corporate fiduciaries administering estates or

trusts.

The bill addresses the issue of financial institution liability

under CERCLA by proposing a more narrow definition of "owner or

32. E.g., Legislation To Restore Small Business FinancingIn Areas Of Possible
Hazardous Waste Contamination, 136 CONG. REC. E1023 (remarks of Rep. John

LaFalce).
33. Id.

34. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
35. H.R. 4494, H.R. 5764, S. 2319, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
36. EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured
Creditor Exemption of CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990).
37. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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This would be
operator" in section 101(20)(D) of the Act.
accomplished by adding five classes of individuals and institutions to

those entities currently exempted from the definition of "owner or
Additionally, the bill defines "designated lending
operator.38
institution" and makes minor conforming amendments to section
101(20)(A) of the Act.39
Senate Bill 2319

On March 22, 1990, Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) introduced
Senate Bill 2319.4"

The bill would amend the Federal Deposit

38. (i) Any designated lending institution which acquires ownership or control
of the facility pursuant to the terms of a security interest held by the person in that
facility.
(ii) Any corporatefiduciary which (I) has legal title to any facility for purposes of
administering an estate or trust of which such
facility is a part; or
(II) does not have legal title to the facility but
operates or manages the facility pursuant to the
terms of any estate or trust of which such facility
is a part.
(iii) Any individual or institution or successor thereto that serves
as an indenture trustee for outstanding debt securities or any
certificates of interest or participation in any such debt securities
and acquires ownership or control of a facility as a result of an
event of default pursuant to the terms of an indenture agreement
or similar financing document between such trustee and the issuing
entity.
(iv) Any individualfiduciary who has legal title to any facility for
purposes of administering an estate or trust of which such facility
is a part.
(v) Any designated lending institution which acquires ownership of
any facility in connection with a lease subject to regulation by
applicable Federal or State banking authorities.
H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. S. 2319, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).

36

WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Insurance Acte1 and the Federal Credit Union Act 2 by specifying
conditions under which depository institutions, mortgage lenders, and
insured credit unions would not be liable under CERCLA for
property acquired either through foreclosure 43 or in a fiduciary
capacity. 44 Furthermore, the bill would confer immunity from
CERCLA liability on regulatory agencies and the National Credit
Union Administration Board for properties acquired by the exercise
of receivership or conservatorship authority and the provision of loans
or other financial assistance. 45 The bill does not address financial

41. 12 U.S.C. § 1811-1832 (1988).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1751-1795 (1988).
43. S. 2319, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
"Property acquired through
foreclosure" is defined as "property acquired by a depository institution or mortgage
lender (A) through purchase at sales under judgment or decree, power of sale, or
from a trustee, if such property was security for a debt previously contracted; or
(B) through conveyance pursuant to a debt previously contracted. "Mortgage lender"
is defined as "a person engaged in the business of making loans secured, in whole
or in part, by real property." "Fiduciary capacity" is defined as "acting as trustee,
executor, administrator, custodian, guardian of estates, receiver, conservator,
committee of estates of lunatics, or any other fiduciary capacity for the benefit of
another." Id.
44. The exemption does not apply to "any person that has caused the release
or threatened release into the environment of a hazardous substance from property
acquired through foreclosure or from property held in a fiduciary capacity" or to
"any person that has benefited from removal, remedial, or other response action,
to the extent of the actual benefit conferred by such action." S. 2319.
45. Neither the Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any Federal Reserve
bank, or any Federal Home Loan Bank, in any capacity, shall be liable
under [CERCLA] with respect to property acquired
(A) in connection with the exercise of receivership or
conservatorship authority, or
(B) in connection with the provision of loans, discounts,
advances, or other financial assistance.
S. 2319, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). This immunity "shall not apply if the
Corporation, agency involved, Federal Reserve bank, or Federal Home Loan Bank
has caused the release, or threatened release, into the environment of a hazardous

LENDER LIABILITY

institution liability for hazardous waste cleanups through an
amendment of CERCLA. The bill also proposes to amend the
Federal Credit Union Act with substantially identical language.

The EPA's Draft InterpretativeRule
On September 14, 1990, the EPA issued a "Draft Proposal
Defining Lender Liability Issues under the Secured Creditor
Exemption of CERCLA. 4 6 In the draft interpretative rule, EPA
interprets the secured creditor exemption in CERCLA so that
"private and governmental lending institutions and successors-ininterest that hold a security interest in a facility may undertake a
variety of activities related to a borrower's facility in the course of
protecting the security interest, without voiding the exemption. 47 The
rule clarifies the secured creditor exemption provisions of section
101(20)(A): "[The] EPA recognizes that lenders typically have
revenue interests in the loan transaction. However, when the lender
holds its indicia of ownership in the property for investment purposes,
as opposed to assuring repayment of the loan, the secured creditor
exemption will not apply."'4 8
The EPA draft rule includes actual examples of what actions
secured creditors may take to safeguard their investment without
destroying the exemption. "[T]he secured creditor may act to protect
the interest by policing the loan, by undertaking financial workout

substance." Id.
46. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990). The rule is intended "to
define the meaning of certain statutory elements in CERCLA which pertain to the
liability of both financial institutions that lend money to facilities and governmental
loan guarantors or entities that acquire ownership, or some indicia thereof, of
contaminated facilities." Id. at 1162.
47. Id.

48. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1163. This parallels the holding in Maryland Bank
& Trus4 supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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with a borrower where the security interest is threatened, and by
foreclosing and expeditiously liquidating the assets securing the
loan."

49

The

draft rule

also addresses

the issue

of what

is a

"reasonable" length of time that a secured creditor may hold property
once they have foreclosed on the loan without removing themselves
from the section 101(20)(A) exemption.5 0 The draft rule shifts the
burden of proof at six months following foreclosure.S/ Under this
bright-line test, the secured creditor may hold the property in
question for six months before it bears the burden of showing that it
continues to hold the property primarily to protect its security
interest.
Finally, the draft rule repudiates the Eleventh Circuit's holding
in Fleet Factors by requiring actual participation in the management
of the company before liability will be invoked, and not the mere
"capacity to influence" the corporation's treatment of hazardous waste.
The proposed rule states: "[p]articipation in management sufficient
to void the exemption means actual operational participation by the
lender, and does not include the mere capacity or ability to influence

49. Id. at 1164.

50. This issue was first addressed by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland in Maryland Bank & Trust, supra note 9. A major factor in
the court's decision to forego the section 101(20)(A) exemption was based upon
the lender's subsequent ownership of the property for four years following its
purchase at the foreclosure sale. The court in Maryland Bank distinguished
Mirabile,supra note 6, stating that there the mortgagee's purchase of the land at
the foreclosure sale was "plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security
interest in the property" since the property was assigned four months later.
Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580. Thus, secured creditors can only guess when,
between four months and four years, liability will be imposed for holding the
property too long.
51. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1167.

LENDER LIABILITY

facility operations. ,,52
House Bill 5764
On October 1, 1990, Representatives McDade and LaFalce
introduced House Bill 5764. 53 The bill proposes to amend sections
7(a) and 7(b) of the Small Business Act54 to exempt the Small
Business Administration ("SBA") and financial and lending institutions
from liability under CERCLA and the Solid Waste Disposal Act
("SWDA"t). 55 Specifically, the bill provides that neither the SBA nor
any financial institution participating with the SBA pursuant to a loan
for a pollution control facility shall be liable for any violations of
CERCLA or SWDA.56 The bill further provides that in any case in
which title or control of property is acquired by the SBA or a lending
institution participating with the SBA, neither the SBA nor the
lending institution shall be liable for a violation of CERCLA or
SWDA.5 7 The Act is prospective in effect from the date of
enactment.

58

52. Id. at 1165.
53. H.R. 5764, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The Short Title of the Act is the
"Innocent Lender Liability Relief Act of 1990."
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-650 (1988).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
56. H.R. 5764 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The bill also provides that the
exemption from liability shall not apply to the SBA or a financial institution which
"by any act or omission, caused or contributed to a release or threatened release
at such property of a hazardous substance (in the case of a violation of CERCLA)
or a regulated substance (in the case of a violation of SWDA)." Id.
57. Id. The bill also states that the exemption from liability shall not apply
where the SBA or a lending institution "by any act or omission, caused or
contributed to a release or threatened release at such property of a hazardous
substance (in the case of a violation of CERCLA) or a regulated substance (in the
case of a violation of subtitle I of SWDA)." Id.
58. Id.
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ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

The secured creditor exemption of CERCLA section
9601(20)(A) 59 has been the focus of much debate, since the federal
courts have not interpreted the provision consistently. 6°
61

in Mirabile

62

and Bergsoe,

The courts

for example, found that the defendant

creditors fell within the exemption and thus were not liable for
64
63
cleanup costs. The courts in Maryland Bank, BFG Electroplating,
and Fleet Factors,65 however, found that the defendants were liable

because they fell outside the exemption. The holdings are not easily
reconciled on the basis of their facts. 66 House Bill 4494 proposes a

significant change in CERCLA, and deserves close analysis.
PracticalEffects of House Bill 4494
House Bill 4494 would narrow the definition of "owner or

operator" in

section 9601(20)(D)

by excluding, inter alia, any

59. "[Owner or operator] does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)
(1988).
60. See, e.g., Bolstein & Reznick, Lender Liability After Fleet Factors, ENVTL
L vol. 10, no. 3, at 1 (1990); Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims
Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1987).
61. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20996
(E.D. Pa. Sept 4, 1985).
62. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
63. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D.
Md. 1986).
64. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa.
1989).
65. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 9-25.
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designated lending institution which "acquires ownership or control of
the facility pursuant to the terms of a security interest. '67 The
amendment would virtually eliminate exposure for hazardous waste
cleanup costs incurred by lending institutions that foreclose on
contaminated property held pursuant to a security interest. Thus,
under this restricted definition of owner or operator, the defendants
in Maryland Bank and BFG Electroplating probably would have
escaped liability.68
The bill fails to address, however, the more difficult question
posed by "participation in the management of a vessel or facility."
The bill does not clarify whether a lender is liable for cleanup costs
in the absence of actual foreclosure on the property; it merely
excludes any designated lending institution "which acquires ownership
or control of the facility." The bill thus does not confront the issue
presented in Fleet Factors, because it fails to address the definition
of "participation in the management of a vessel or facility." Under
such a rule, when faced with a situation in which a lender did not
foreclose on contaminated property but participated in the
management to some degree, a court would remain free to find that
some degree of participation is necessary to invoke liability, 69 or that
mere capacity to influence is sufficient, 70 or that some other as yet

67. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
68. In Maryland Bank and BFG Electroplating, the defendants foreclosed on
the property held as a security interest. Thus, lending institutions in similar
situations would qualify for the bill's exclusion from the definition of owner or
operator for any acquisition of ownership or control "pursuant to the terms of a
security interest ... in that facility." H.R. 4494. The question remains, however,

whether this new provision would forever exempt property obtained pursuant to the
terms of a security interest.
69. E.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
70. E.g., United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied,
911 F.2d 742 (llth Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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undefined standard is appropriate.
Policy Questions Raised by House Bill 4494
CERCLA creates three main classes of potentially responsible
parties: past and present owners and operators of vessels or facilities,
transporters, and disposers of hazardous waste.71 The definition of
owner or operator does not now exclude persons who participate in
the management of a vessel or facility, despite the fact that they may
hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest in the
vessel or facility. Rather, the statute's scheme of liability clearly
considers the possibility that a party holding title merely pursuant to
a security interest may be liable, if it has "participated in the
management" of a vessel or facility. Liability thus turns on case-bycase factual determinations of involvement in the affairs of the
debtor, and not on any bright-line rules.
House Bill 4494, however, proposes such a bright-line rule.
The bill would exempt "any designated lending institution which
acquires ownership or control of the facility pursuant to the terms of
a security interest" regardless of the level of "participation in the
management" of the vessel or facility. On the one hand, factual
determinations of participation would no longer be relevant, since
lending institutions which hold title pursuant to a security interest
would never be liable for hazardous waste removal costs as long as
they do not actually "cause or contribute to the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances. "72 On the other hand, the bright
line rule is inadequate because it fails to address the Fleet Factors
scenario where the lender does not acquire title, and participation in
management is thus relevant to determine liability.

71. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
72. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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Increased Reliance on the Superfund
By carving out a large exception to owner or operator liability,
House Bill 4494 reduces the commitment to identifying responsible
parties. As fewer private parties incur responsibility for hazardous
waste removal, Superfund will increasingly become the only source of
money available. Unless support for the Superfund is increased, total
hazardous waste removal will decrease. This would be a significant
shift in hazardous waste policy and warrants a more comprehensive
review of CERCLA.
Reduced Incentive to Monitor Hazardous Waste Activities
House Bill 4494 would effect another troubling shift in
hazardous waste policy. CERCLA now encourages diligence by those
involved in hazardous waste creation, transport, or disposal, since the
scheme of strict, joint, and several liability is severe. This liability
creates a long term incentive for all potentially responsible parties
to reduce hazardous waste generation and comply with removal laws
and regulations. As CERCLA is now drafted, lending institutions
are also encouraged to be diligent by monitoring the activities of their
73
debtors, since the lenders themselves may ultimately be held liable.
Under House Bill 4494, lender diligence would not be encouraged,
since lenders would be exempt from liability in all situations in which
they acquire ownership or control.
"Cradle to Grave" Liability Scheme Altered
House Bill 4494 also upsets the internal fairness of CERCLA,
which created an equally strict scheme of liability across the spectrum
of hazardous waste handlers. Piecemeal amendments and incremental

73. Even the court in Fleet Factors stated that "[n]othing... should preclude

a secured creditor from monitoring any aspect of a debtor's business. Likewise, a
secured creditor can become involved in occasional and discrete financial decisions
relating to the protection of its security interest without incurring liability." Fleet
Factors,901 F.2d at 1558.
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exceptions to the list of potentially responsible parties destroys the
equity of the "cradle to grave" scheme of liability and reduces the
overall effectiveness of CERCLA as a remedial statute. Congress
should first examine CERCLA in its entirety and then consider
specific changes.

Lender Immunity and Unjust Enrichment
Finally, Congress should consider whether lenders are unjustly
enriched by immunity from hazardous waste cleanup liability. The
court in Maryland Bank expressed the concern that exemption from
liability under CERCLA would enable banks to collect a windfall
profit from the increased value of the property following the federal
government's cleanup. 74 Although the Environmental Protection
Agency has a lien power under CERCLA to secure reimbursements
for the costs of hazardous waste cleanups, the lien only takes priority
from the time it is filed of record. 7s
At least six states have enacted "superlien" statutes which
elevate the priority level of environmental claims in bankruptcy
proceedings. 76
The superlien statutes give the government's
environmental claim, which is a general unsecured claim, priority over
perfected secured interests. Several of the statutes extend the lien
further to encompass all of the debtor's property even if that
property is not related to the environmental violation. Furthermore,
these statutes generally do not establish time periods of limitation in
74. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.
Md. 1986).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(3) (1988).
76. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§ 82-4708, 4720 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-452a (West 1985), amended by, Act of July 3, 1985, 1985 Conn. Acts
443, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 468 (West 1985); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13
ANN.

(Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1If(f) (West Supp. 1985), amended by, Act of Jan. 22,
1985, 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 47 (West 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209
(Supp. 1985).
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which the government liens must be filed, so that at any time after
77
the pollution is discovered the property may be subject to a lien.
These liens also "ride through" the confirmation of the debtor's plan
and may be filed against successive land owners. 78 Notably, New
79
Jersey's superlien statute has survived constitutional challenge.
As part of a comprehensive review of hazardous waste policies,
Congress should consider whether a comparable superlien provision
should be added to CERCLA.
PracticalEffects of the Draft Interpretative Rule
Although the draft interpretative rule is less sweeping in effect
than the three congressional bills that have been introduced, it was
viewed by the EPA as a major concession and compromise.80 The
proposed rule indicates that the EPA is willing to exempt a secured
creditor liable if it is merely acting to protect a security interest. To
81
this end, a wide range of activities are expressly allowed by the rule.

77. Epling, EnvironmentalLiens in Bankruptcy, 44 Bus. LAW. 85, 87 (1988).
78. Id. at 87-88.
79. Kessler v. Tarrats, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326 (1984). The court
held that the statute was a permissible exercise of the State's police power. The
lien provisions of the Spill Compensation and Control Act served a legitimate
public purpose, imposed reasonable terms and conditions, and did not constitute
a taking without just compensation or an impermissible impairment of contract.
Id
80. Cope, EPA To Revise Rules On Lender Liability In Toxic Cleanups, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 6, 1990, at 1.

81. "A secured party is considered to be acting within the scope of the
exemption if it regularly or periodically monitors the borrower's business, requires
or conducts on-site inspections and audits, requires certification of financial
information or compliance with applicable duties, laws or regulations, or requires
other similar actions, provided that the borrower remains substantially in possession
and control of the operations of the facility." Draft Proposal Defining Lender
Liability Issues Under The Secured Creditor Exemption Of CERCLA, 21 Env't
Rep. (BNA) at 1162, 1164 (Oct. 12, 1990).
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The proposed rule is a workable and fair compromise to the
question of lender liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs. The
rule would give lenders specific parameters to guide their conduct
with debtors involved with hazardous waste. At the same time, the
rule is not a blanket exemption from CERCLA liability which would
compromise the policy goals enunciated by Congress in 1980 and
1986.
CONCLUSION

The federal courts have interpreted the scope of lender liability
for hazardous waste cleanups under CERCLA in an inconsistent
manner. Many people believe that the courts have increased lender
exposure for hazardous waste cleanups beyond what was intended
when CERCLA was drafted. In response to this issue, Congress has
introduced three bills and the EPA has proposed a draft
interpretative rule. All of these would limit lender liability under
CERCLA to some degree.
The legislative proposals are inadequate solutions. House Bill
4494 is particularly disturbing because it would exempt lenders from
liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs incurred on property
acquired pursuant to a security interest.
Such a drastic, yet
fragmented approach to hazardous waste policymaking is
inappropriate given the complexity of the interests affected by
CERCLA.
The draft interpretative rule is a sound compromise at this
time. It would help clarify lender liability without granting a broad
exemption to financial institutions that acquire contaminated property
through foreclosure. The rule also gives lenders specific guidelines
with which to govern their debtors' activities. If more radical changes
to CERCLA are desired, they should be pursued in the context of a
comprehensive review of hazardous waste policies.

